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A DECADE OF DAUBERT
DAVID G. OWEN'
INTRODUCTION
Products liability litigation, involving the inner workings of science
and technology, often resolves into a "battle of the experts."' Proof of
defectiveness and causation often requires engineers, toxicologists, epi-
demiologists, and other technical experts to explain the relevant science
and engineering of product safety and accidents to a lay jury and the
court.2 Understanding the various aspects of the design, manufacture, and
labeling of products normally involves a host of complex, technical con-
siderations requiring specialized expertise. Thus, mechanical, chemical,
and materials engineers, chemists, physicists, pharmacologists, epidemi-
ologists, and other technical specialists are often necessary to provide the
fact finder with a comprehensive understanding of the manufacturing of
a product, how it operates, whether and how it may have malfunctioned
or otherwise caused an accident, and how a different design could have
avoided similar accidents.
As products liability law spread its tentacles over the nation during
the last third of the twentieth century, the expert witness business was
born, grew up, and flourished. Tormented by a mounting plague of sup-
posed "experts" testifying to "junk science" in courtrooms across the
nation, manufacturers increasingly complained about the unfairness and
illogic of basing outcomes in major products liability litigation on such
f Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A later version of
this article will appear as part of a chapter in DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
(forthcoming 2004). Thanks to Nikki Lee for research assistance. To shield him from the rigors of a
Daubert challenge, I did not seek advice from Dr. Hubbard. Copyright © 2002 David G. Owen &
Westgroup.
1. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ruling
that conflicting expert conclusions result in a "classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury
must decide the victor"); Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1971) ("It all
boils down to a battle of experts."). This simple fact of products liability litigation has long been
true. See generally DAVID PECK, DECISION AT LAW 40-64 (1961) (detailing expert testimony on
nature of break, of hickory grain of spoke, and of tests and inspections of broken automobile wheel
involved in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Il1 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)).
2. See, e.g., Bruno v. Toyotomi U.S.A., Inc., 203 F.R.D. 77, 80 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to produce qualified and reliable expert
testimony on defectiveness and causation); Mozes v. Medtronic, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128 (D.
Minn. 1998) (granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to produce qualified
and reliable expert testimony on defectiveness and causation); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills
Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991, 995 (Ala. 1981) ("Ordinarily, expert testimony is required" in cases
based on strict products liability in tort.).
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slender, defective reeds. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court joined
issue with the problem in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
3
A decade now has passed, and it is time for a review of the use and abuse
of expert testimony in products liability litigation.
I. SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimony has special significance in products liability litiga-
tion for several reasons. Most fundamentally, judges and juries in most
products liability cases use this testimony as the primary tool in deciding
whether a particular product was defective and whether that defect
caused the plaintiffs injury. Some products, and the causes of some
product failures, are quite simple to understand, such as the explosion of
a thermos bottle4 or the presence of a cockroach in a sandwich.5 In such
cases, expert testimony is unnecessary for there is little "beyond the ken"
of the judge or jury.6 But the mechanisms of most product failures are
more complex. In such cases, judges and juries generally are dependent
on the information and opinions provided by scientific and technical spe-
cialists on the complex issues that typically lie at the heart of a products
liability case. In this respect, judges and juries, who impliedly are inca-
pable of understanding the technical aspects of such a case, are at the
mercy of the experts. In addition, the law of evidence gives experts espe-
cially wide latitude to offer opinions not available to ordinary witnesses.7
For these reasons, expert testimony can be particularly powerful guid-
ance, and it has a particular power to mislead.8 While the rules governing
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4. See Virgil v. Kash N' Karry Service Corp., 484 A.2d 652, 656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(implosion).
5. See Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In Rest., Inc., 736 So. 936, 938 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (chili
dog).
6. Virgil, 484 A.2d at 656 ("The general rule is well established that expert testimony is only
required when the subject of the inference is so particularly related to some science or profession
that it is beyond the ken of the average layman."); see Faryniarz v. Nike, Inc., No. 00 Civ.
2623(NRB), 2002 WL 530997, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2002) (finding that expert testimony was
unnecessary for jury to find running shoes were defectively designed because of excessively long
laces that could get caught on pull-tab).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 701, 702, 703, 705 and similar state evidentiary rules. See generally
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) ("Federal Rules of Evidence, not
Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.").
8. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("Judge Weinstein has explained: 'Expert evidence can be
both powerful and misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it."' (citation omitted)); Bert
Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge,
72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 789 (1994) ("[M]ost commentators believe ostensibly scientific testimony may
sway a jury even when as science it is palpably wrong. Science can be greatly distorted by the
pressures of litigation, but once it is admitted into evidence, it has an imprimatur of legitimacy and
validity, and cross-examination often will not expose its flaws."); see also Adina Schwartz, A
"Dogma of Empiricism" Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to
Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 196-98
(1997).
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the admissibility of expert testimony on science and technology are
treated extensively elsewhere,9 the topic is so centrally important to
products liability litigation that it deserves special treatment in this con-
text.
Expert testimony is often necessary to establish defectiveness in
manufacture, design, and warnings and instructions. As mentioned ear-
lier, juries normally need the guidance of expert testimony to understand
the technical aspects of both defectiveness and causation. Without such
testimony, juries would be left to surmise, conjecture, and speculation on
these central elements of every case and cause. Thus, a products liability
9. See generally D. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW-STANDARDS, STATISTICS &
RESEARCH ISSUES (2002) (giving an in-depth coverage of admissibility, nature of expertise, ethical
issues, scientific method, statistical proof, survey research, epidemiology, and toxicology); Louis
FRUMER & MELVIN FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.06 (2001); MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 27:8 to :9 (3d ed. 2000); CHARLES T. McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON
EVIDENCE §§ 13-19. (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("General scientific acceptance is a proper
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence."); REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994);
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE ch. 702 (2d ed. 2002). There are hundreds of law review and
practice articles on the topic. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Substance & Form in Scientific Evidence:
What Daubert Didn't Do, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 234, 242-46 (Larry Kramer
ed., 1996); Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539
(1996); Sarah Brew, Where the Rubber Hits the Road: Steering the Trial Court Through a Post-
Kumho Tire Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 467 (2000); Daniel J.
Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699 (1998); Marjan Damaska, Truth In Adjudication, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 289 (1997); David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections and
Ruminations on the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
661 (2000); G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its
Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1996); Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament:
Determining "Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000); Michael Green, Expert
Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange
and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 643, 661 (1992); Sara K. Ledford, The Implications of
Kumho Tire: Applying Daubert Analysis to Warning Label Testimony in Products Liability Cases,
76 IND. L.J. 465 (2001) (discussing the difficulties in attempting to apply Daubert criteria to warning
label testimony); Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1314 (1999); Xavier Pena, The Effective Evaluation of Expert Reliability, 20 REV.
LITIG. 743 (2001); Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS 229 (2000); Schwartz, supra note 8; Richard T. Stilwell, Kumho Tire:
The Battle of the Experts Continues, 19 REV. LITIG, 193 (2000); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000)
(examining causation study by National Science Panel); see also Brett B. Baber, The Necessity for
Expert Testimony to Sustain the Plaintiff's Burden of Proof in Negligence and Strict Liability
Actions, 15 ME. B.J. 174 (2000); Patricia A. Krebs & Bryan J. De Tray, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 34 TORT & INS. L.
J. 989 (1999); D. Alan Rudlin, The Judge as Gatekeeper: What Hath Daubert-Joiner-Kumho
Wrought?, 29 PROD. SAF. & LIAB. REP. 329 (2001); Charles D. Weller, The Litigator's Guide to the
Daubert Quartet: The Use of Experts After Daubert, 1 EXPERT EVID. REP. 62 (2001); Larry E.
Coben, The Daubert Decision: Gatekeeper or Executioner?, TRIAL, Aug. 1996, at 52. The BNA
Expert Evidence Report reports recent cases.
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case usually will fail without proof of defect and cause by expert testi-
mony.'
0
Manufacturing defects are sometimes so self-evident that expert
proof may not be required, but expert testimony ordinarily will be neces-
sary to establish that an accident product deviated from the manufac-
turer's design specifications." And while reliance on the malfunction
doctrine can sometimes assist a plaintiff when the precise cause of a
product failure cannot be shown,12 expert proof is often necessary, even
under this theory of recovery, to rule out other possible causes of the
accident. 13
Simple warnings issues sometimes are entirely comprehensible by a
jury and thus may not necessitate expert testimony.1 4 But the science of
how to communicate danger and safety information most effectively is
evolving in sophistication such that expert testimony on warnings and
instructions is often helpful, and sometimes mandatory, as in many cases
involving the labeling of dangerous machinery,
5 pharmaceutical drugs, 16
and in other specialized labeling situations.1
7
10. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Weber-Stephen Prod. Co., 2002 WL 1370671, at *2 (4th Cir. 2002)
(applying Md. law and granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to provide
expert testimony on why gas grill exploded; without such testimony "[a] jury could only infer the
presence of a defect in the grill by engaging in 'surmise, conjecture, or speculation' (quoting Jensen
v. Am. Motors Corp. 437 A.2d 242, 245 (Md. 1981))); Hochen v. Bobst Group, Inc., 290 F.3d 446,
450-51 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying Mass. law and affirming summary judgment against plaintiff who
failed to designate expert under FED.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) in complex case involving allegedly defective
design and manufacture of printing press); Moisenko v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 100 F.
Supp. 2d 489, 492-93 (W.D. Mich. 2000) ("Without expert evidence comparing a striker plate with a
flat-ending to one with a rolling-ball ending, Mr. Moisenko cannot meet the risk-utility test, and thus
cannot establish a design defect .... As to the manufacturing defect claim, it is well-settled that such
a claim cannot be proven without expert testimony." Defendant's motion for summary judgment was
granted.); Lessard v. Caterpillar, Inc., 737 N.Y.S.2d 191, 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ("The court
properly granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, given the inability of plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case of design defect in the absence of expert testimony."); Brooks v. Colonial
Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Ala. 1991) ("Because of the complex and technical
nature of the product and in order to present evidence from which a lay jury may reasonably infer
that a defective condition of the product was the cause of the product's failure and the cause of the
resultant injury to the plaintiff, expert testimony is usually essential and, therefore, usually
required."); see also MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 27.9 (discussing Weisgram v. Marley Co.,
528 U.S. 440 (2000)).
11. See MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 7.11.
12. Seeid. §7.12.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting issue).
15. For a description of a sophisticated system, see PRODUCT SAFETY SIGN AND LABEL
SYSTEM (1993).
16. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Am. Pharmaceutical Assoc. ed., 13th
ed. 2002); PATIENT INFORMATION IN MEDICINE (Ronald Mann ed., 1991).
17. See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 9; Ledford, supra note 9, at 465
(applying Daubert to warning-label testimony).
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Most jurisdictions define design defectiveness in terms of risk-
utility analysis, an analytical approach that requires an evaluation of the
feasibility, costs, and benefits of altering a design to avoid an injury.'
8
Such claims almost always require expert proof, sometimes on the
mechanisms of how the accident occurred and almost always on how the
accident feasibly could have been designed away.' 9 However, if design
defectiveness is defined purely in consumer expectation terms, 20 the ap-
propriateness of expert testimony may depend upon the type of product
whose design is under scrutiny. A jury might well need expert guidance
on the safety expectations of users of industrial, professional, or other
products designed for use by specialists in a field. But consumer goods,
particularly simple ones, are another matter. It is difficult to see how the
opinion of a technical or other expert on ordinary consumer expectations
about the safety of a simple consumer product could assist a jury, which
would seem to preclude expert testimony on defectiveness in such
cases. 2' Even design cases may be simple, however, in which case expert
22testimony is unnecessary.
Regardless of the type of defect, expert testimony often is necessary
to prove causation, the link that connects the product defect to the plain-
tiffs harm.23 Causation is most typically in issue in toxic substance
cases, where expert testimony on causation (and defectiveness) almost
invariably is necessary. 24 Even in cases involving durable goods, where
proofs of defectiveness and causation are often linked together closely,
expert testimony on how the defect caused the harm is usually necessary
to the plaintiff's case.25
18. See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 8.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Expert witnesses normally cannot assist the jury in determining consumer expectations.
See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) ("[W]here the minimum safety
of a product is within the common knowledge of lay jurors, expert witnesses may not be used to
demonstrate what an ordinary consumer would or should expect. Use of expert testimony for that
purpose would invade the jury's function .... "); Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233
(Cal. 1982) ("[O]ne can hardly imagine what credentials a witness must possess before he can be
certified as an expert on the issue of ordinary consumer expectations." (quoting G. Schwartz,
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435,480 (1979))).
22. See Faryniarz, 2002 WL 530997, at *2.
23. See generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 12.
24. See, e.g., Rutigliano v. Valley Business Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996)
(granting summary judgment claim of "formaldehyde sensitization" from exposure to chemical in
carbonless carbon paper); see generally David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and Into the Fire:
The Expert Witness Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117, 119-23 (1990) (examining
expert witness problems in toxic substance cases). Causation in toxic substance litigation is treated
generally in MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 12.5.
25. See, e.g., Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(regarding a fire allegedly caused by toaster oven).
2002]
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To give but a few examples, judges and juries surely will need ex-
pert tutelage on defectiveness if the issue in dispute is whether the speed
control mechanism for a paver should have been in the form of a lever
rather than a rotary dial;26 whether a sport utility vehicle should have
been equipped with a barrier between the front seats and cargo area, to-
gether with a warning, to make it safe for occupants in the rear;
27
whether and how the steering gearbox in a vehicle may have been im-
properly assembled or designed;2 8 whether the operator compartment on
a forklift should have been equipped with a door
29 or wire mesh;30
whether cigarettes could have been made safer; 31 or whether a hay baler
should have had a guard.32 Similarly, on causation, the fact finder will
almost certainly need expert testimony if the parties disagree on whether
a causal link exists between a plaintiff s ingestion of Viagra and his heart
attack;33 an allegedly defective product and a house fire that starts
nearby; 34 the absence of a kill switch on an outboard motor and injuries
to the plaintiff's hand;35 an anti-depressant drug taken by a teenager and
his suicide; 36 a spinal rod implanted in the plaintiff's back to eliminate a
painful condition and his quite similar post-operative pain; 37 or exposure
to various chemical substances and many illnesses and diseases.38 In
short, experts are crucial to both the prosecution and defense of a prod-
ucts liability case.
26. See Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 2001).
27. See Bowersfield v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 151 F. Supp. 2d 625,630 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
28. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2000).
29. See, e.g., Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 865 (7th Cir. 2001); Berry v.
Crown Equip. Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
30. See Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2000).
31. See LaBelle v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 2-98-3235-23 (D.S.C. July 5, 2001), available at
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/DOCS/Pmd/LABELLE.pdf 11-13.
32. See Masters v. Hesston Corp., No. 99-C50279, 2001 WL 567736, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23,
2001).
33. See Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 596, 601 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
34. See, e.g., Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 440 (heater); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 569 (6th
Cir. 2000) (cigarette lighter); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 150 F. Supp. 2d 360,
362 (D. Conn. 2001) (clothes dryers); Booth, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 217 (fire allegedly caused by toaster
oven); Pappas v. Sony Elec., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 413, 415 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (television).
35. See Brooks v. Outboard Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89,92 (2d Cir. 2000).
36. See Miller v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1118 (D. Kan. 2002) (discussing Zoloft
and excluding the testimony of plaintiffs expert, a psychologist and psychopharmacologist, on
specific and general causation).
37. See Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1314 (N.D. Okla. 2000).
38. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (determining
whether inhaling talcum powder lubricant on gaskets aggravated sinus condition); Heller v..Shaw
Indus., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (determining whether carpet caused respiratory illnesses); Mattis
v. Carlon Elec. Prod., 114 F. Supp. 2d 888, 890 (D.S.D. 2000) (determining whether vapors from
PVC cement caused reactive airways dysfunction syndrome).
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11. QUALIFICATIONS AND SOURCES OF EXPERT WITNESSES
To serve as an expert witness, an individual must first be quali-
fied-"by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"39-to
offer opinions on the particular specialized matter before the court.40 The
bulk of experienced and otherwise qualified specialists in most fields of
product design, manufacturing, and labeling are employed by private
industry-by the very manufacturing enterprises who constitute the de-
fendants in products liability litigation. Thus, because such persons are
already in its employ, a manufacturer usually has little difficulty finding
appropriate engineering and other experts to help defend a products li-
ability case. Indeed, such experts may include the very persons who de-
signed the accident product, advised on appropriate warnings, and de-
signed and supervised the assembly process. Plaintiffs' lawyers, on the
other hand, generally are limited to two principal resource pools for ex-
pert witness talent: universities and private consulting expert firms.41
I1. THE RISE OF THE "PROFESSIONAL" EXPERT WITNESS AND
THE PROBLEM OF "JUNK SCIENCE"
As products liability litigation began to mushroom in the late 1960s
and the 1970s, so too did the plaintiff s need for experts to battle a manu-
facturer's engineers and other experts over issues of product defective-
ness and causation-in expert reports, depositions, and ultimately at trial.
Straining the pool of then-existing technical talent, a surge in demand for
expert testimony in the 1970s and 1980s spawned a whole new industry
of "professional" expert engineers and other consulting specialists who
mostly, but not exclusively, 42 supported the plaintiffs bar. Many such
39. See FED. R. EviD. 702.
40. See, e.g., Goodwin v. MTD Prod., Inc., 232 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing a case
involving a lawn mower that discharged a wing nut into plaintiff's eye; engineer was not qualified to
give expert opinion on nature, scope, or cause of eye injury); Robertson v. Norton Co., 148 F.3d 905
(8th Cir. 1998) (discussing the explosion of a ceramic grinding wheel; ceramics engineer was not
qualified to testify on adequacy of warnings); Polaino v. Bayer Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.
Mass. 2000) (ruling that the chemist was not qualified to testify on defectiveness of x-ray chemical
mixer); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (N.D. Okla. 2000) ("The
simple possession of a medical degree is insufficient to qualify a physician to testify as to the
advantages of a spinal fixation device, the medical causation of spine-related ailments, or the
mechanical functioning of an orthopedic implantation device."); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP,
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 833-35 (Wis. 2001) (ruling that a chemist not qualified to testify on whether
latex gloves caused allergic reaction).
41. Sources for the latter include H. PHILO ET AL., LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE: TECHNICAL
SOURCES FOR CONDUCTING A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION (9th ed. 2001), the ATLA Products
Liability Exchange, at http://www.altanet.org (last visited Oct. 31, 2002), and Technical Advisory
Service for Attorneys ("TASA"), an expert referral service, at http://www.tasanet.com (last visited
Oct. 31, 2002). Among the many engineering and other expert consulting firms are Engineering
Design & Testing Corp., at http://www.edtengineers.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2002), and Triodyne
Inc., at http://www.infoserve@triodyne.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
42. While manufacturers substantially rely on their own in-house technical experts, they
frequently use outside consultants for accident reconstruction and the development of other proofs
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experts were of course entirely competent to testify on the issues they
agreed to evaluate. But others advertised a willingness to testify, for a
fee, on the defectiveness (and even the appropriateness of punitive dam-
ages) of just about anything,
43 "from toys to airplanes. '44
The very idea of a professional expert witness is- problematic.
"Expertise" in any field requires substantial time to accumulate and to
stay abreast of current developments-by reading, experimenting,
writing, perhaps teaching, and otherwise pursuing knowledge in the
specialized field of study. The problem is that much of a professional
expert's time is spent in courtrooms and preparing for trial rather than
pursuing expertise. Moreover, because most professional experts are
economically dependent on being retained by lawyers to testify that
particular products were (or were not) defective and caused (or did not
cause) particular injuries, they have a natural bias to arrive at conclusions
that favor their employers. Without a steady moral compass-grounded
in a personal reservoir of knowledge, judgment, and professional
conviction-a professional witness will be tempted to tell the employing
lawyer what the expert thinks the lawyer wants to hear, rather than what
he or she needs to hear. Whether working for the plaintiff or defense, this
temptation for professional witnesses to mold their findings and conclu-
sions to make the case for their employer is persistent and strong; and it
is insidious, in part because they may hide weaknesses in their testimony
from their own employer.
The kind of twisted testimony45 that too easily results from a hired
expert's natural bias provides one explanation of why professional wit-
nesses sometimes contradict themselves in different cases, a strategic
Achilles heel which an opposing attorney may discover by diligent re-
search. If the opposing attorney does not reveal such conflicting testi-
mony until the trial, both the expert and the employing attorney will find
themselves in the dreadful predicament of trying to explain the contradic-
for trial. One such firm of engineering and scientific consultants drawn upon by defendants, at least
in automotive products liability litigation, is Exponent.com, at http://www.Exponent.com (last
visited Oct. 31, 2002).
43. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985) ("[A] Ph.D. can be found to swear
to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter how false or foolish."); see generally Bernstein, supra
note 24, at 119-23 (examining the seamy side of the expert witness business).
44. One "system safety and human factors enginee[r]," listed in a technical expert directory, is
said to have testified "in over 100 cases with products ranging from toys to airplanes." See
PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND TRANSPORTATION DIRECTORY 196 (1983). For problems with
professional expert witnesses, see generally Douglas R. Richmond, The "Professional Expert"
Witness: Doctor Lichtor, I Presume?, 17 J. PROD. & Toxics LtAB. 197, 223 (1995) (arguing for a
"cause of action for expert witness malpractice").
45. For one expert's primer on how to mislead a jury, see Sanchez v. Black Bros. Co., 423
N.E.2d 1309, 1320 (Il. App. Ct. 1981) (excerpting a speech given by defendant's witness to
engineering group on how to manipulate juries and obfuscate answers on cross examination).
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tion on the spot. On occasion, professional witnesses knowingly provide
false, perjurious testimony, which, if discovered, will likely devastate the
party's entire case.46
The explosion of expert testimony in products liability litigation
during the 1970s and 1980s, fueled by an expanding plaintiffs' bar fed by
contingent fees, quite naturally led to a rather rapid increase of products
liability lawsuits based on novel, untested, abstract, and occasionally
quite fantastic theories of science and technology, propounded by "ex-
perts" who sometimes were dubiously qualified to testify on issues on
which they claimed expertise. As products liability litigation during this
period marched along, courts 47 and commentators, 48 always skeptical of
this form of witness,49 increasingly decried a perceived growth in abuses
of expert testimony-of "junk science" run amok.50
46. See, e.g., Harre v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (reversing and
remanding judgment for defendant because verdict based in part on perjured testimony by defense
expert); see also Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 399 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that trial
court properly excluded evidence that one of plaintiffs experts was under indictment for perjury);
see generally Richmond, supra note 44, at 223.
47. See, e.g., Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 576 P.2d 426, 435 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(Andersen, J., dissenting), affid, 588 P.2d 1346 (Wash. 1979).
48. The "junk science" concept was promoted and popularized by Peter W. Huber who
worked for the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think-tank. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991) [hereinafter HUBER, GAILILEO'S
REVENGE]; PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333 (1985). For a powerful rebuttal, see Kenneth J. Chesebro,
Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637 (1993).
49. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Hubbel, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (N.Y. 1884) (stating that the expert
witnesses' "opinions cannot fail generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in which
they are enlisted"); Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J.
247, 249 (1910) (noting "a constant complaining and mistrust on the part of judges, juries and
lawyers of the expert witness").
50. See HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 48, at 3.
Junk science cuts across chemistry and pharmacology, medicine and engineering
.... It is a catalog of every conceivable kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking,
truculent dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud.
On the legal side ... [is] a speculative theory that expects lawyers, judges, and juries
to search for causes at the far fringes of science and beyond. The legal establishment has
adjusted rules of evidence accordingly, so that almost any self-styled scientist, no matter
how strange or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify in court. The same
scientific questions are litigated again and again, in one courtroom after the next, so that
error is almost inevitable.
Junk science is impelled through our courts by a mix of opportunity and incentive.
"Let-it-all-in" legal theory creates the opportunity. The incentive is money: the prospect
that the Midas-like touch of a credulous jury will now and again transform scientific dust
into gold.
Id.; see generally Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595,
597-98 & nn. 1-3 (1988) (arguing that the problems historically posed by scientific evidence are
becoming increasingly difficult because an "expert witness can be found to support almost any
decision").
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IV. EARLY LIMITATIONS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
At early common law,5' the only real limitation on expert testimony
was that the person proffered as an expert be qualified as an expert in the
field. The courts generally allowed such experts to provide relevant tes-
timony about technical matters as a matter of course: once a person was
qualified as an expert, the judge simply admitted into evidence his or her
relevant opinion testimony. 2 This liberal approach to expert testimony
reflected the thought that the market from which an expert made a living
had reliably tested the quality of that expertise.53 While the marketplace
test generally may have worked satisfactorily to permit expert determina-
tions on whether a carriage maker or pharmacist acted with reasonable
care in making a carriage or mixing a medicine, this test was unhelpful
when applied to expert opinions about new science or technology, where
an established market for such expertise did not yet exist.
This was the situation the Supreme Court faced in Frye v. United
States,54 in which the defendant in a murder case offered the results of an
early polygraph test to show his innocence. In passing on the merits of a
new form of science or technology, ruled the Court, the test is whether it
is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs. ' 55 Shifting the fulcrum of decision from
the expert to the expertise,56 the Frye "general acceptance" test tended to
exclude testimony on cutting-edge science and technology since new
ideas become accepted wisdom only over time. During the next half cen-
tury, Frye's general acceptance standard, although increasingly criti-
51. On early expert testimony, see John M. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB.
L.J. 365 (1880); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1901); see also FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 9; David L. Faigman
et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding
the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 1799,
1803-09 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman et al., Crystal Balfl(concluding that a rigorous and thorough
analysis of scientific data should be undertaken before admission into court); Stephan Landsman, Of
Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 131, 133 (1995) (understanding that Daubert represents a step towards greater
judicial control, yet raises questions about "the evenhandedness of heightened judicial scrutiny of
proffered expert testimony").
52. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 3-5.
53. "The assurance of expertise was implied by the expert's success in an occupation or
profession that embraced that knowledge .... In effect, the marketplace determined whether valid
knowledge existed by endowing it with commercial value." Id. at 4.
54. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
55. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
56. See generally Faigman et al., Crystal Ball, supra note 51, at 1805-09.
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cized,57 evolved into the prevailing test for admissibility of expert testi-
mony.58
As modem products liability and other technical litigation expanded
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, coincident with the debate over the
Federal Rules of Evidence then under consideration, the Frye test sud-
denly became quite "trendy. 59 In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence
were adopted, including Rule 702, which provided for the admission of
scientific and technical evidence by a qualified expert if such testimony
would "assist the trier of fact" (i.e., if it is helpful to the jury),6° and Rule
703, which allowed an expert to rely upon facts and data "reasonably
relied upon by experts" in the field.6' Neither Rule 702 nor the Advisory
Committee's comment on it made any reference to the Frye test, but
most jurisdictions interpreted this rule to incorporate Frye's general ac-
ceptance standard.62
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the logic and fairness of Frye's
general acceptance test came under increasing scrutiny as courts increas-
ingly debated whether and to what extent this test might be consistent
with Rule 702.63 During this period, the courts struggled to find a balance
between the need to open courtrooms to new science, on the one hand,
with the problems from allowing experts to propound bad science, on the
other. Increasingly, courts began to strike this balance by at least par-
tially shifting the focus away from whether the science was "generally
57. Criticisms often centered on its conservatism and its vagueness. See, e.g., FAIGMAN ET
AL., supra note 9, at 7-10 (examining criticisms of the Frye test).
58. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1980); Gerard Harrison, Comment,
Liars, Damn Liars, and Expert Witnesses, Unhelpful Approaches to Unreliable Scientific Testimony
in the Third and Fifth Circuits, 29 Hous. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (1992).
59. See Harrison, supra note 58, at 1034-35. But not all courts and commentators approved of
the general acceptance test of admissibility. See MCCORMICK, supra note 9, at 874-75 ("General
scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a
suitable criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.").
60. At the time, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provided: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702 (2000). Rule 702 was
amended in 2000 to reflect the holding in Daubert.
61. Federal Rule of Evidence 703, prior to the Dec. 1, 2000 amendments, provided: "The facts
or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible evidence." FED. R. EvID. 703 (2000).
62. See Faigman et al., Crystal Ball, supra note 51, at 1803-09.
63. See generally Harrison, supra note 58, at 1057 (arguing that proper interpretation of Rules
702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides courts with adequate tools "to regulate the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence," thus making the Frye test unnecessary).
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accepted," the Frye approach, to an evaluation of the methodology by
which the expert reached his or her conclusion. 64
V. DA UBERT AND ITS PROGENY
A. Daubert
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,65 after several years of
avoiding the issue, 66 the Supreme Court in 1993 finally decided to exam-
ine the admissibility of expert testimony on novel scientific theories and
the relationship of the Frye test to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Daubert involved the drug Bendectin, an anti-nausea medicine
that, from 1956 until 1983, physicians widely prescribed to pregnant
women for morning sickness.67 From the first Bendectin case filed in
1979, which claimed that the drug had caused the plaintiff's missing and
malformed fingers, nearly 2000 similar cases eventually were filed
claiming damages for birth defects from the drug.68 In Daubert, filed late
in the life cycle of the litigation, the plaintiffs claimed that Benedictin
administered to their mothers during pregnancy caused their birth de-
fects.69 The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that no
causal link existed between Bendectin and birth defects.7° In affidavits
from its expert scientists, the defendant showed that none of the thirty-
eight epidemiological studies of Bendectin published to date had found a
64. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (stating that in order for an expert's scientific conclusions to be admissible, they must, inter
alia, be based on "a well-founded methodology"); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307,
310 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that difficult questions such as whether Bendectin caused birth defects
compel courts to "critically evaluate the reasoning process by which the experts connect data to their
conclusions in order... to consistently and rationally resolve the disputes before them"), modified,
884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); see
generally Harrison, supra note 58, at 1057 (arguing that examining an expert's methodology would
make the Frye test unnecessary).
65. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
66. See, for example, Justice White's dissents to the denial of certiorari in Mustafa v. United
States, 479 U.S. 953, 953-54 (1986), and Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 503 U.S. 912, 912
(1992). Prior to Daubert, the Frye test, which had been used almost exclusively in criminal cases,
was increasingly subject to criticism. See Gross, supra note 9, at 242-46.
67. See Green, supra note 9, at 661 (indicating that Bendectin was prescribed during the 1960s
and 1970s to upwards of 25% of all pregnant women in the U.S.). On the Bendectin litigation, see
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS
TORT LITIGATION (1998); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation
in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Sanders, From Science to Evidence];
Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992); Gross, supra note 9, at 243-44 (summarizing the Bendectin litigation).
68. See Sanders, From Science to Evidence, supra note 67, at 4.
69. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
70. Id.
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causal connection between birth defects and the drug.71 In opposition, the
plaintiffs offered affidavits from eight witnesses who concluded--on the
basis of chemical structure analysis, in vitro (test tube) studies of animal
cells, in vivo (live) animal studies, and a "reanalysis" of the previous
epidemiological studies-that Bendectin could in fact cause birth de-
fects.72 Concluding that the plaintiffs' proffered expert evidence did not
meet Frye's "general acceptance" standard of admissibility, the district
court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed."
In the Supreme Court, the petitioning plaintiffs argued that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence had superseded the Frye "general acceptance"
standard.7 4 Vacating and remanding, the Supreme Court agreed that the
Rules do not allow a court to use the degree of acceptance of a subject of
scientific testimony as the sole determinant of admissibility.75 Because
Rule 702 allows qualified experts to testify about "scientific ... knowl-
edge," the Court reasoned that a trial judge must determine that proposed
expert testimony is both "scientific" and "knowledge"-that the subject
of the testimony is "ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of sci-
ence," that it is "derived by the scientific method. 76 An expert's pro-
posed testimony must be "supported by appropriate validation - i.e.,
'good grounds."' 77 In short, expert testimony must be reliable.78 In addi-
tion to requiring expert testimony be reliable, the Court further reasoned
that Rule 702 requires that such testimony be relevant, since the rule
demands that expert scientific or technical testimony "assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.,,7 9 This is
the "helpfulness" requirement of Rule 702, requiring that expert testi-
mony be sufficiently related to disputed facts to help the jury resolve
facts or issues in dispute, a requirement that may be simply described as
71. There are four common types of scientific studies used to determine the toxicity of a
substance:
[1] analyses of the chemical structure of the compound that focus on similarities between it
and known toxins; [21 in vitro tests that examine its effects on human or animal cells that are
cultivated in the laboratory for this purpose; [3] in vivo studies that test its effects on
laboratory animals; and [4] epidemiological studies that examine its effects on human beings.
Gross, supra note 66, at 238. Epidemiological studies on large populations of humans are widely
considered the most informative measure of toxic consequences of the substance. Id. at 238-39.
"Ihere is general agreement that epidemiological studies are the best and most informative, since
only they provide direct evidence on the occurrence of pathologies in people." Id.
72. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
73. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), affig 727 F. Supp.
570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
74. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
75. See id. at 587-89.
76. Id. at 589-90.
77. Id. at 590.
78. See id. at 589-90.
79. Id. at 591.
2002]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"fit. '80 Thus, when a party proffers expert scientific testimony, the trial
court must make a preliminary determination of both the (1) reliability
(or validity), and (2) relevance (or fit) of the expert's reasoning or meth-
odology underlying the testimony proposed.81
Among the factors a court may usefully employ in assessing the va-
lidity of an expert's proffered testimony on scientific evidence, the Court
noted five:
(1) Testability: whether the theory or technique is testable and has
been tested - its ability to withstand objective, verifiable challenge
and scientific trial;
82
(2) Peer review: whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication;
(3) Error rate: whether it has an acceptable known or potential rate of
error;
(4) Control standards: whether its operation has been subjected to
appropriate standards of control; and
(5) General acceptance: whether it is widely accepted in the relevantS83
scientific community.
These are Daubert's now-familiar reliability factors. In determining the
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702, the Court emphasized
that the inquiry into pertinent reliability considerations should be flexi-
ble, and that the focus of inquiry "must be solely on principles and meth-
odology, not on the conclusions that they generate." 84 Because the lower
courts had based their decisions in this case almost exclusively on Frye's
general acceptance standard, rather than on the broader reliability and fit
80. See id. at 591-92.
81. Id. at 592-93. Thus, "a trial judge must evaluate the proffered testimony to assure that it is
at least minimally reliable; concerns about expert testimony cannot simply be referred to the jury as
a question of weight." Capra, supra note 9, at 701-02.
82. The Advisory Committee's version of this factor is more prolix: "whether the expert's
technique or theory can be or has been tested - that is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged
in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RuLES 152 (2d ed. Supp. 2002).
83. See id. at 593-94. Although the Court lumps factors (3) and (4) together, which has led
most observers to a four-factor count, the separation of these two different considerations clarifies
analysis. The five-factor list is adapted from Capra, supra note 9, at 702, which is the basis for the
formulation in FED. R. EviD. 702, advisory committee's note (2000 amendment).
84. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.
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requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Supreme Court re-
manded the judgment to the Court of Appeals.85
B. Supreme Court Progeny
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court has revisited the expert testi-
mony issue a number of times. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,86 a dis-
trict court applied Daubert to exclude expert testimony that purported to
link the plaintiffs exposure to PCBs to his lung cancer, and the court of
appeals reversed.87 Reinstating the district court's ruling, the Supreme
Court emphasized that federal trial courts have wide discretion to ex-
clude expert testimony, holding that such determinations are only subject
to a permissive "abuse of discretion" standard of review.88 The Court
further noted that Daubert's direction that courts focus on the expert's
methodology in no way precluded a trial judge from scrutinizing the
quality of the expert's conclusions.89
Next came Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,90 a tire blowout case in-
volving a worn tire containing at least two punctures that previously had
been inadequately repaired. In a suit against the tire manufacturer, the
plaintiffs claimed, on the basis of deposition testimony of an expert in
tire failure analysis, that the cause of the blowout was a defect in the tire
rather than abuse.9' Although the expert's testimony might have been
viewed as "technical" rather than "scientific," the trial court applied the
gatekeeping principles of Daubert, closely scrutinizing the reliability of
the expert's hypotheses, methodology, and conclusions.92 Concluding
that they failed each of the Daubert factors, and that their reliability had
not been established on any other ground, the district court excluded the
expert's testimony and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.93 The court of appeals reversed, ruling that Daubert applied
85. On remand, applying the Daubert analysis, the Ninth Circuit ruled again that the district
court had properly excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony, concluding that the testimony of one of
the plaintiffs' experts was not reliable and that the testimony of the others was not relevant because
they would only testify that Bendectin is "capable of causing" birth defects, not that the drug in fact
(more likely than not) caused the plaintiffs' birth defects. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 43
F.3d 1311, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1995).
86. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
87. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 140-41.
88. Id. at 141.
89. The Court remarked:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained
experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence, which is
connected, to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion preferred.
Id. at 146.
90. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
91. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.
92. See id. at 145.
93. Id.
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only to experts relying on "scientific" principles rather than on the kind
of skill- or experience-based observation of the type relied upon by the
plaintiff's expert.94 Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
held that Rule 702's broad reference to expert testimony on "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge" means that the Daubert gate-
keeping principles apply to all expert testimony. 95 Further, the Court
reaffirmed the flexibility of the reliability inquiry and noted that the trial
court has wide latitude, subject only to review for abuse of discretion, to
determine what reliability factors are appropriate to the particular expert
96testimony under examination.
The final Supreme Court decision to date on expert testimony is
Weisgram v. Marley C0.,97 a wrongful death action against the manufac-
turer of a heater arising out of a house fire. On testimony by three experts
that the heater was defective and that the defect caused the fire, the plain-
tiffs obtained a judgment on a jury verdict, over the defendant's objec-
tion that the testimony was unreliable and therefore inadmissible under
Rule 702 and Daubert.98 The court of appeals reversed, agreeing with the
defendant that the plaintiffs' expert testimony offered mere speculation
as to the heater's defectiveness, making it scientifically unsound.99
Rather than remanding for a retrial, and reasoning that the plaintiffs had
had a fair opportunity to prove their claim and so did not deserve a sec-
ond chance, the court of appeals directed judgment for the defendant
manufacturer. 1°° The Supreme Court affirmed.' 0' Rejecting an argument
that a plaintiff might hold certain expert testimony in reserve to shore up
the claim if the proffered expert testimony were to be found insufficient,
the Court noted that Daubert put parties relying on expert evidence on
notice of "the exacting standards of reliability" demanded of such evi-
dence. 10 2 "It is implausible to suggest, post-Daubert, that parties will
initially present less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of
a second chance should their first try fail.' 0 3 Reminding parties (usually
plaintiffs) that they may well not get a second chance, Weisgram under-
scores Daubert's basic message: parties bear responsibility for presenting
expert testimony rigorously grounded in good science and technology
and relevant to the particular issues in the case.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 147-49.
96. See id. at 149-53.
97. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
98. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455-56.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 446.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 455.
103. ld.
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C. Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702
In 2000,1°4 the Supreme Court approved certain amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence on opinion evidence and expert testimony to
conform them to the principles of Daubert and its progeny. 105 In addition
to making certain minor changes to Rules 701 and 703, the amendments
added an important proviso to Rule 702 that permits expert testimony
only if such testimony is grounded on "sufficient facts and data" and is
the result of "reliable principles and methods" which are themselves re-
liably applied to the facts of the case. 106 The Advisory Committee's help-
ful Note to the 2000 amendment of Rule 702 observes that the amend-
ment requires only that the data, principles, and methods used by an ex-
pert are reliable and reliably applied, 10 7 and that the quality of expert
testimony still largely remains tested by cross-examination and the other
safeguards of the adversary system. 0 8 Observing that "[a] review of the
case law after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the
exception rather than the rule,"' 9 the Committee Note adds that the
amendment "is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic chal-
lenge to the testimony of every expert."" 0
As for Daubert's reliability factors, the Advisory Committee's Note
reiterates Daubert's five-factor list set forth above and further enumer-
ates several additional factors courts have found useful in varying con-
texts:
(1) Whether experts are "proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independ-
ent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions
expressly for purposes of testifying."
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an ac-
cepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alterna-
tive explanations.
104. The amendments were effective Dec. 1, 2000, a quarter century after the Rules were first
adopted in 1975.
105. See generally FED. R. EviD. 702 avisory committee's note (2000 amendment).
106. With the amended language italicized, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now provides in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EviD. 702.
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(4) Whether the expert "is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting."
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to
reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give.1II
While recognizing the importance of these and the original Daubert fac-
tors, the Advisory Committee observed that the amendment makes no
attempt to "codify" the factors, which the Supreme Court has empha-
sized are not exclusive.11 2 Instead, the new standards added to Rule 702
are "broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the specific
Daubert factors where appropriate."' 3 In sum, the amendment (including
the Committee Note) to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 does not provide a
conclusive roadmap for each specific aspect of expert testimony, but it
does provide helpful guidance on the fundamental Daubert reliability
principles.
14
D. Daubert in the Lower Federal Courts
Daubert has, as intended, forced courts to examine expert testimony
more closely. Post-Daubert, the federal district courts, exercising their
newly appointed "gatekeeper" function, have scrutinized expert testi-
mony more closely, often holding rigorous pre-trial "Daubert hear-
ings"-that are often outcome determinative-to determine the admissi-
bility of proffered expert testimony. 11 5 But heightened judicial scrutiny of
expert testimony does not mean that a court will necessarily exclude a
plaintiffs expert testimony, even if it is unusual: the circuit courts some-
times affirm plaintiff verdicts in novel contexts in which the traditional
scientific indicia of defectiveness or causation is marginal at best,1 6 and
they will reverse a district court for excluding a plaintiffs expert testi-
111. Id. (internal citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Pointing to the Supreme Court's admonition that Daubert's reliability factors are not
exclusive, the Advisory Committee's Note observes that the amendments do not attempt to "codify"
the factors but instead set forth standards that are "broad enough to require consideration of any or
all of the specific Daubert factors where appropriate." Id.
115. See, e.g., Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 n.12 (N.D. Ala.
2001); see also Rudlin, supra note 9, at 336.
[T]he Daubert hearing and ruling have effectively become virtually as case outcome
determinative as a class certification hearing and ruling: once decided, a case either
shrivels up and goes away, or becomes more dangerous to try. Daubert hearings are often
every bit as case dispositive, practically speaking, as a summary judgment hearing. Thus,
practitioners whose cases rely in any material way on expert testimony must ...be
prepared for a full-blown "trial within a trial" that the Daubert hearing often becomes.
Id.
116. See, e.g., Bonner v. ISP Tech., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 927-28 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming an
award for an assembly line worker, who exposed to defendant's organic solvent, suffered
psychological injuries, cognitive impairment, and Parkinsonian symptoms).
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mony with excessive zeal. 17 But Daubert decisions frequently go the
other way, excluding a plaintiff's expert testimony as unreliable or ir-
relevant. Thus, the lower federal courts have disallowed expert testimony
on Daubert grounds because the expert proposed to testify on a novel
causal theory, not generally accepted or subjected to peer review, that
was developed only for the litigation;1 8 relied too heavily on the tempo-
ral proximity of harm to its alleged cause; 119 failed sufficiently to inspect
or test the accident product or a proposed alternative design;12 failed
117. See, e.g., Lauzon v. Senco Prod., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 691 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
only three published articles supported expert's theory that bottom-fire pneumatic nailers are
defective, but ruling that limited peer review is not fatal because such nailers are new product);
Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 720-21 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting expert testimony on single
ground of lack of peer review is abuse of discretion; no single factor is conclusive in determining
reliability of expert's methodology); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.
1998) (ruling that the trial court failed properly to consider the reasoning and methodology of
plaintiff's expert).
118. See, e.g., Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1313 (ruling, on remand, that testimony of plaintiffs
experts, on link between Bendectin and birth defects, was not reliable or relevant); Grant v. Bristol-
Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000) (ruling that the conclusions of
plaintiff's experts-that silicone breast implants cause various systemic diseases-was developed
for the litigation, had not gained acceptance in the relevant scientific community, and that their
scientific methods were not practiced by a recognized minority in the field); Nelson v. Am. Home
Prod. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d 954, 972 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (ruling that none of plaintiffs experts had
conducted independent research, outside context of litigation, on whether defendant's heart
medication caused damage to optic nerve and vision).
119. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999) (ruling causation
testimony unreliable when symptoms did not appear for two weeks after carpet was installed and
remained after it was removed); Polaino v. Bayer Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D. Mass. 2000)
(ruling that expert's hypothesis, resting on temporal proximity rather than scientific principles, was
classic illustration of fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc); Wynacht v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1209 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding that expert opinion on causation based solely
on temporal relationship was unreliable, given complex nature of facts and expert's failure to
identify biochemical, medical, or toxicological basis for opinion). But the immediacy of acute
symptoms to exposure may buttress the reliability of an expert's causation hypothesis. See, e.g.,
Bonner, 259 F.3d at 931 (ruling strong temporal connection is sometimes powerful evidence of
causation).
120. See, e.g., Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2001) ("hands-on
testing is not an absolute prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony, but the theory here easily
lends itself to testing and substantiation by this method, such that conclusions based only on personal
opinion and experience do not suffice"); Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (noticing
that defendant's expert subjected cigarette lighter that allegedly malfunctioned to replicable
laboratory tests, but plaintiffs experts did not); Brooks v. Outboard Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89, 91,
92 (2d Cir. 2000) (ruling that plaintiffs expert failed to test his theory that lanyard-activated kill
switch would have disengaged motor boat engine under circumstances of accident to user's hand:
"The failure to test a theory of causation can justify a trial court's exclusion of the expert's
testimony."); Shanks v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-383, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22468, at *7
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2001) (finding examination, but no testing, of ladder for load-bearing capacity);
Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 2d 215, 215 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Berry v. Crown Equip.
Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 754 (E.D. Mich. 2000) ("courts interpreting Daubert have considered
testability of the expert's theory to be the most important of the four factors, and this is especially
true in cases involving allegations of defect in product design"); Polaino, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 68-69;
LaBelle v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 2-98-3235-23 (D.S.C. July 5, 2001), at *11-13 (regarding no
testing of supposedly safer cigarette design). But see Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:2
faithfully to reconstruct the circumstances of the accident;' 2 1 failed to
provide a theory of causation supported by sufficient confirmatory stud-
ies; 122 failed to conduct a differential diagnosis to rule out alternative
potential causes, 123 or applied such an approach improperly; 124 failed to
show the relevance ("fit") of accepted principles to the plaintiffs case;
125
or otherwise failed to proffer reliable and relevant testimony-supported
by reliable data, methods, or conclusions-that was likely to aid the trier
of fact. 126 Quite often, an expert's testimony will fail Daubert scrutiny
for many of these reasons.
127
150 F. Supp. 2d 360, 366, 367 (D. Conn. 2001) (ruling that although theory was not tested, it was
capable of being tested; testimony admitted).
121. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001);
Brooks, 234 F.3d at 92.
122. See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001) (ruling
that proposed expert testimony was insufficient to show that Parlodel can cause intracerebral
hemorrhages); Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000) (ruling that the
expert's differential diagnosis identified condition, not the cause); Wynacht, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1209
(ruling that the treating clinical physician failed to explain in a scientifically reliable manner how
wastewater discharge from lab analyzer caused plaintiff's respiratory, neurological, digestive,
cardiovascular, and urinary problems that followed the discharge).
123. See, e.g., Turner, 229 F.3d at 1208 (ruling that the expert made no attempt to exclude
possible causes of respiratory problems, allegedly caused by accidental discharge of substance from
fire suppression equipment, until only one remained); see also Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631
N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001) (applying Frye test to facts, but adopting Daubert prospectively).
124. See, e.g., Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 989 (ruling that although differential diagnosis is
presumptively admissible, experts lacked basis for "ruling in" Parlodel, drug for suppressing
postpartum lactation, as cause of stroke); Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316
(N.D. Okla. 2000) (ruling that expert's failure to explain why he eliminated other possible causes
rendered methodology unreliable); see also Katherine R. Latimer, A Good Bedside Manner Wouldn't
Be Enough, Either: Differential Diagnosis Under Daubert, 1 EXPERT EVID. REP., 33 (2001); Joseph
Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove
Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 120-22 (2001).
125. See, e.g., Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1321-22 (affirming, on remand, summary judgment for
defendant in Bendectin birth defect case because plaintiff's experts could not testify that relative risk
was more than the 2.0 necessary to show probability of causal connection); Cipollone v. Yale Indus.
Prod., Inc., 202 F.3d 376, 380 (1st Cir. 2000) (ruling that expert's testimony on dangerously narrow
gap between fixed and moving handrail of loading dock lift was based on supposition that person's
hand was widened by holding object, but plaintiff was holding nothing when accident occurred);
Rapp v. Singh, 152 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (recognizing that crashworthiness experts
rigorously analyzed how plaintiffs car was propelled under defendant's tractor trailer, but data was
insufficient on how absence of vertical attachment to bumper made design defective); Groome v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., No. 92-CV-3073, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4082, at *4-5, *7-8
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (ruling that where plaintiffs expert had to loosen safety switches to get
microwave to operate with door open, his testimony that "it would be a 'very easy mistake' to install
them improperly" did not "fit" because there was no factual basis for his opinion).
126. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp. Inc., 243 F.3d at 441 (excluding testimony on crash theory by
accident reconstructionist, based on photographs alone and dubious testimony of expert
"foamologist"); Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 779 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruling on chemicals
that allegedly caused leukemia); Cacciola v. Selco Balers, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181-83
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (ruling that, having neither inspected machine itself nor interviewed injured
worker, the engineer's deposition testimony that machine's safety interlock switch was too
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It may well be that the experts in each case in which the testimony
was excluded propounded bad science, or perhaps the plaintiffs' attor-
neys simply failed to adequately prepare their experts on the Daubert
requirements before the trial, or perhaps they failed at trial (or at a
Daubert hearing) to provide the court with a sufficient offer of proof.
Yet, the cases show that Daubert provides federal trial judges with a
powerful operating manual for excluding expert testimony that, in the
court's sound discretion, fails to meet current criteria for "good sci-
ence." 128 There is indeed some logic to the view, suggested by the Su-
preme Court itself in Daubert,129 that its ruling is balanced in its effect-
that, while closing the door to testimony based on unreliable theories and
methodologies, it opens the door to expert testimony on cutting-edge
science and technology. 30 But the fact remains that only infrequently do
courts invoke Daubert to exclude expert testimony proffered by defen-
dants.'13 Instead, courts almost always apply Daubert principles (often
with good reason) to exclude a plaintiffs experts and, hence, to bar the
plaintiff's claim.1
32
accessible, based on photographs alone, "rests upon unsubstantiated generalizations, speculative
hypotheses and subjective evaluation that are based neither upon any professional study or
experience-based observation").
127. See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 156-58 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling that the
"haphazard, intuitive inquiry" of plaintiffs expert engineer, who conducted no tests nor calculated
forces involved in vehicle accident, failed each of eight reliability factors); Milanowicz v. Raymond
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525, 537, 540 (D.N.J. 2001) (ruling that the testimony of consulting engineer
on forklift truck design failed each of nine reliability indicia court reconfigured from Daubert for
engineering dases).
128. See, e.g., Brooks, 234 F.3d at 90, 92 (ruling expert testimony that outboard motor,
propeller which injured plaintiffs hand should have been equipped with kill switch inadmissible
because plaintiffs expert had never seen the boat or motor, either in person or in photographs; did
not know boat's configuration or dimensions; had not spoken to boys involved in accident nor
otherwise knew precisely how accident happened; nor attempted to reconstruct the accident to test
his theory that a lanyard-activated kill switch would have disengaged motor under circumstances of
accident); Berry, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (ruling that even if proffered expert witness had been
qualified to testify on forklift design safety, his opinions were "quite simply unsupported by any
reasonable measure of technical data or foundation and are wholly unreliable"); cf. Brasher, 160 F.
Supp. 2d at 1295 n.12 (noting a busy trial court's natural temptation to apply Daubert "heavy-
handedly" to reduce a heavy caseload).
129. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-97.
130. See, e.g., Bonner, 259 F.3d at 928 (arguing that "[tihe first several victims of a new toxic
tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply because the medical literature, which
will eventually show the connection between the victim's condition and the toxic substance, has not
yet been completed" (quoting Turner, 229 F.3d at 1209)).
131. See, e.g., Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 801-02, 804 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000)
(reversing summary judgment for defendant, granted on basis of affidavits of defendant's expert
witnesses; on remand, proposed testimony of defendant's experts should be subjected to Daubert
scrutiny); Edwards v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (excluding
defendant's and plaintiffs experts alike).
132. See LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CRIM. JUST., CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMfrrING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT
DECISION 62 (2001) (summarized at http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB9037 (last visited Feb.
23, 2003)).
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Booth v. Black & Decker, Inc.'33 provides an example of a court ap-
plying Daubert to exclude a plaintiffs expert testimony. The case in-
volved claims of defective manufacture and design against the manufac-
turer of a toaster oven for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict li-
ability in tort for fire damage to the plaintiffs' house.' 34 Although the
Fire Marshall determined that the fire was caused by a recently-repaired
microwave that had been used shortly before the fire, the plaintiffs ex-
pert, 135 Thomas, determined that the fire originated in the defendant's
toaster oven located in the same portion of the kitchen. 136 The defendant
moved for summary judgment, which hinged on the admissibility of
plaintiffs' expert testimony that the toaster oven was defective and
caused the fire. 1
37
The court held a two-day Daubert hearing on Thomas' qualifica-
tions and the reliability of his opinion that the toaster oven was defective
and caused the fire. 138 The court first concluded that Thomas was quali-
fied to offer expert testimony on the electrical aspects of consumer appli-
ances, including toaster ovens, and that he was qualified to interpret the
results of a scanning electron microscope examination he had conducted
on the oven. 139 On the issues of manufacturing defect and causation,
Thomas hypothesized that while someone was operating the toaster oven,
its power contacts spontaneously welded together, causing the toaster
oven to overheat and catch fire.140 Attempting to confirm this hypothesis,
Thomas testified that he used an electron microscope to examine the
contacts, which showed indications of melting and scoring, suggesting to
him that the surfaces had welded together.141 The toaster oven was defec-
tively designed, in Thomas' view, for two reasons: (1) because it lacked
a thermal cut-off device, to cut off power when the oven reached a cer-
tain temperature, to prevent it from overheating, and (2) because it con-
tained an excessive amount of plastic with a low melting point.
142
Applying the Third Circuit's version of the Daubert factors, 143 the
court ruled that the evidence failed to establish the reliability of Thomas'
133. 166 F. Supp. 2d 215 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
134. Booth, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
i35. Id. at 222.
136. Id. at 217.
137. Id. at 216.
138. Id. at 217.
139. Id.
140. Id. at219.
141. Id. at 218.
142. Id.
143. See Oddi, 234 F.3d at 145 (listing eight factors: the traditional five Daubert factors, plus
"(6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the
qualifications of the expert witness... ; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been
put").
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methodology. 44 Thomas' manufacturing defect theory was testable, but
he had not attempted to get the power contacts of a similar toaster to
weld together. 145 While his microscopic investigation was a form of test,
he failed to adequately explain why indications of melting and scoring
mean that welding has occurred, nor did he offer any other basis for his
conclusion other than his personal experience and "broad and circular
assertions that such markings simply are what happens when welding
occurs." 6 Thomas asserted that his fire investigation methods were gen-
erally used by others in the field, but he failed to produce persuasive ob-
jective evidence to this effect. 147 Prompted by defense counsel, Thomas
claimed that he followed the fire investigation guidelines of the National
Fire Protection Association, but he did not point to any specific proce-
dures in the guidelines that he had followed. 48 Nor did any credible evi-
dence exist to establish that Thomas' examination method "was subject
to peer review, had a known or potential rate of error, could be measured
by existing standards, or was generally accepted."'149 In short, because
Thomas "did not take sufficient care in supporting the credibility or reli-
ability of the methodology he applied, despite the best efforts of counsel
to elicit it," his testimony that the toaster contained a manufacturing de-
fect was inadmissible. 150 Similarly, Thomas' design defectiveness theo-
ries, on which he offered no methodology whatsoever, were equally defi-
cient: he neither sketched nor produced an example of the kind of ther-
mal cut-off device he recommended, nor did he install one on an exem-
plar oven to test its ability to prevent overheating. 15' While he claimed
that Black and Decker used such a device on an oven sold in Canada, he
failed to produce the Canadian model. 52 As for his theory of excessive
plastic materials, Thomas never explained how the plastic might have
caused or affected the fire.
53
Thus, whether or not Thomas in fact conducted a reasonable inves-
tigation into the cause of the fire, he failed to provide the court with
"enough basic, objective information" on the reliability of the investiga-
tion and his opinions based thereon.
154
Thomas performed no tests of his own to determine whether his hy-
potheses were indeed true; he merely examined the toaster oven and
144. See Booth, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
145. Id.
146. Id.




151. Id. at 221.
152. ld.
153. Id. at219n.4.
154. Id. at 221-22.
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concluded it could have been safer. His testimony ... seemed wholly
based on his own training and experience, and he provided the Court
with no objective anchor for his conclusions.
1 55
Based on a review of Thomas' expert reports, deposition testimony, and
testimony during the Daubert hearing, the court found his causation in-
quiry to be "intuitive and haphazard, his methodology to be unreliable,
and, consequently, his conclusions to be suspect.' 56 Since the plaintiffs
had failed to meet their burden of establishing the reliability of Thomas'
testimony under the principles of Rule 702, Daubert, and Kumho Tire,
Thomas' expert testimony on causation was inadmissible.157 Because the
plaintiffs had no other evidence to establish that a defect in the toaster
oven probably caused the fire, the court granted summary judgment for
the defendant.5 8
But Daubert seeks to exclude only invalid or irrelevant evidence,
and even a rigorous application of its principles does not compel the
exclusion of expert testimony that is merely inconclusive or otherwise
only marginally helpful to the trier of fact. Many product accidents leave
few and ambiguous clues of accident causation, especially if the product
is severely damaged in the accident or lost thereafter,1 59 and the issue of
design defectiveness is by nature vague and indeterminate. 16 In such
cases, courts should allow plausible expert hypotheses, provided they are
based on sound methodology and reasoning, that attempt to reconstruct
the origins of the accident and how it might have been prevented.
Rudd v. General Motors Corp.16' is an example of a case that al-
lowed a plaintiff's expert testimony after rigorous Daubert scrutiny. The
plaintiff was injured when a fan blade on his pickup truck broke lose and
struck him while he stood in front of the truck's open hood twisting the
distributor housing to adjust the engine's timing.162 Plaintiff sued the
vehicle manufacturer, claiming that the fan blade had been made of de-
fective metal, a claim based largely on the testimony of his expert,
Edmondson, a mechanical engineer with extensive experience in failure
155. Id.at221.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 222.
158. Id. at 223. Nor would the malfunction theory help the plaintiffs, since even that theory
required reasonable inferences that the particular product had malfunctioned and caused the harm.
Because of the multiple possible causes of the fire in this case, expert testimony on causation was
necessary on the malfunction theory, too. id. at 220 n.5.
159. On the malfunction theory, see MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, § 7.12.
160. On design defectiveness, see generally MADDEN & OWEN, supra note 9, at ch. 8.
161. 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
162. Rudd, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1332, 1340.
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analysis. 63 GM moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff
had offered no admissible evidence of a manufacturing defect.
64
Choosing not to hold a Daubert hearing,' 65 the court ruled on the
admissibility of Edmondson's testimony on the basis of his expert report
and deposition testimony. 66 Edmondson found no direct evidence of a
physical flaw in the fan blade, but arrived at his conclusion circumstan-
tially by excluding other possible explanations of how the fan blade
might have broken. 67 In particular, he first determined that the plaintiff's
use of the vehicle at the time the fan blade broke was entirely proper: the
plaintiff's technique in adjusting the timing, while running the engine at
1200 to 1500 rpms, was entirely normal and specifically recommended
by GM's tune-up manuals. 168 Next, based on Edmondson's visual ex-
amination, his "total indicator reading" measurements of the accident fan
and fan assembly, and his background reading, he determined that prior
to the accident the fan blade had not been bent, at the site of the fracture
origin or elsewhere, and that no visible damage to the blade existed that
might have caused the fatigue fracture and break. 169 Had the fan blade
been subjected to a sudden trauma during operation, Edmondson testified
that it would have left physical indicia of the trauma, such as broken
paint, scarring, or denting, none of which were visible. 170 The absence of
any indications that the fan had encountered abnormal forces during op-
eration led him to conclude that a microscopic manufacturing defect,
such as a scratch, grind mark, gas bubble, or an inclusion caused a metal-
fatigue fracture.' 7' The court concluded that Edmondson's systematic
elimination of alternative causes led to circumstantial proof of defective-
ness that was relevant to a jury's determination of that issue.
72
Although the reliability of the Edmondson's expert evidence was a
closer question, the court concluded that it met each of the three specific
reliability standards of new Rule 702-that it was based on (1) sufficient
163. Id. at 1332, 1338.
164. Id. at 1339.
165. Normally, the decision whether to hold a Daubert hearing is entirely discretionary with the
trial court. There may be no need for such a hearing if the parties have developed an extensive
evidentiary record, including expert reports, depositions, and the literature that supports the expert
opinions, and assuming that the issues are well briefed. Id. at 1334 n.3 (citing authorities); see
Nelson, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 967; Schafersman, 631 N.W.2d at 877. As with any discretionary matter,
however, a trial court's failure to hold a Daubert hearing in particular circumstances, whether or not
requested by the losing party, may be an abuse of discretion, particularly if the admissibility issue
turns on factual issues and will be determinative of summary judgment. See Padillas v. Stork-
Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412,418 (3d Cir. 1999).
166. See Rudd, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
167. Id. at 1342.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1340.
170. Id. at 1341.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 1342.
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data, (2) reliable principles and methods, and (3) reliable application of
the methods to the facts. 73 First, the factual basis of Edmondson's testi-
mony was sufficient-based on his visual inspection of the accident fan
blade and other fans, his account of the use history of the truck and fan
blade, his "total indicator reading" measurements, his reliance on two
failure-analysis publications (which included a case study of a car fan
fatigue fracture) and GM tune-up manuals, and his background and train-
ing analyzing metal fractures, 174 including automotive fan fatigue frac-
tures. 75 Second, the court ascertained that Edmondson's method for de-
termining the cause of the fatigue fracture-by eliminating ("ruling out")
other possible causes-was a well-established and reliable scientific
method for determining causation. 76 Moreover, because a specialty pub-
lication had employed the process-of-elimination method in a failure
analysis model, which included a case history of a fatigue fracture in an
automobile fan, this method further satisfied Daubert's reliability factors
on publication and acceptance within a relevant community of experts.
77
Third, and finally, the court found that Edmondson reliably applied this
method to the accident fan-by determining that the fan's history did not
include improper operation and by closely inspecting the fan blade metal
for physical indicia of other causes. 178 Noting that Edmondson could not
fairly be expected to assign a particular error rate to his techniques, 179 the
court concluded that his testimony was reliable, and hence admissible,
"because he provide[d] a step-by-step and transparent account" of "rea-
soning processes and data sources" on which he relied, "the physical
indicia he associate[d] with each possible alternative cause, and his rea-
sons for excluding each of the alternative causes. ' 8 By fully revealing
the basis of his opinions, Edmondson's testimony thus supplied the de-
fendant with a fair basis to challenge his opinions by cross-examination
173. Id.
174. The court quoted the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 702 to the effect that an expert's
experience (alone or "in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education") may
provide a sufficient foundation for the expert's testimony if the witness explains "how that
experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion,
and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts." Id. at 1336.
175. Id. at 1342-43.
176. Id. at 1343. In the medical context, experts quite often apply this well-accepted method for
determining causation, called "differential diagnosis" (or "differential etiology"). See generally
Brew, supra note 9, at 482-83 (stating that differential diagnosis, the process of "eliminating other
possible causes, is an essential methodological component in establishing specific causation");
Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 124 (focusing on "one of the more difficult causal issues in
torts: the proof of specific causation in toxic tort suits ... through a process the courts have called
differential diagnosis").
177. See Rudd, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
178. id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1344.
[Vol. 80:2
2002] A DECADE OF DAUBERT
and the presentation of contrary evidence, the basic tools of the adversary
process. 181
E. Daubert in the State Courts
Because Daubert interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 702, it applies
by its terms only to the federal courts. For this and other reasons, quite a
few state courts, still trusting in Frye and other conventional rules gov-
erning the admissibility of expert testimony, have refused to adopt the
Daubert principles. 182 Yet, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert in 1993,183 many courts had already adopted reliability princi-
ples quite similar to Daubert' s, and since that time an increasing number
of states have rejected Frye and swung over to the Daubert point of
view. 84 In addition, a large majority of states have adopted codes of evi-
dence patterned on the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702
upon which Daubert is based. 85 Moreover, to the extent that Daubert's
precepts are grounded in reasoned principles of logic and fair play for
adjudicating disputes involving principles of science and technology,
those precepts have a certain logical and moral power that is difficult for
state courts to ignore. For these reasons, a growing number of state
courts, very possibly a majority, have now adopted the Daubert princi-
ples of reliability and relevance for expert testimony.'
8 6
181. Id.
182. As of 2002, roughly fifteen states still purport to follow Frye. Recent reaffirmations of
Frye and rejections of Daubert include: Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 134 (Ariz. 2000) (en
banc, 3 2 decision); Byrum v. Super. Ct., No. B153001, LEXIS 3809, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20,
2002); Donaldson v. Cent. 111. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 323 (Il. 2002); Kuhn v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1178 (Kan. 2000); Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 798
So. 2d 374, 382 (Miss. 2001); Krause, Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 566, 569 (Nev. 2001); Blum v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 2000). See generally Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement
from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 208 (1998) (stating that
"by 1992 after the Frye heyday had passed states were poised for a new test," and as such, only four
years later, "28 states either have adopted the Daubert standard, explicitly assimilated it as similar to
a test already in place, or maintained a Daubert-like test without mentioning Daubert"); States Move
to Daubert, Even When They Say They're Stuck on Frye, 2 EXPERT EVID. REP. 161 (2002) (noting
that nineteen states and the District of Columbia still adhere to Frye) [hereinafter States Move to
Daubert].
183. See Hamilton, supra note 182, at 209 (summing that "thirty-three states have adopted
Daubert since the Supreme Court decided the case, while seventeen states continue to employ the
Frye standard").
184. As of 1998, Hamilton counted thirty-three states that had adopted Daubert, to which tally
at least two additional states must be added. See People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001)
(replacing Frye test with Daubert reliability standards); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d
862, 867 (Neb. 2001) (same).
185. Hamilton reported that, as of 1998, only Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and
Pennsylvania had not adopted Rule 702, and noted that Massachusetts had adopted Daubert
judicially. Hamilton, supra note 182, at 209. Note, however, that few, if any, states have yet adopted
the December 2000 amendment to Rule 702 that explicitly incorporates the Daubert principles.
186. The counts of states vary wildly. Compare Hamilton, supra note 182, at 209 (counting
thirty-three states embracing Daubert principles), with States Move to Daubert, supra note 182, at
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CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF DAUBERT
In Daubert and its progeny, the Supreme Court attempted to bridge
the yawning gap between how reality is perceived and described, and
how problems are resolved, in science and the law. 87 In particular, the
Court sought to improve the legitimacy of judicial determinations involv-
ing science and technology by forcing courts to rigorously scrutinize the
foundations of an expert's scientific or technological opinions. This is a
messy task that requires both courts and lawyers to do the kind of rigor-
ous science they may have entered law to avoid. 188 By abandoning Frye's
"general acceptance" standard, which was based on the precept that
courts should defer to scientific communities to decide for themselves
whether a particular type of scientific approach should be recognized as
useful, Daubert switched the basic responsibility for making such deci-
sions to the courts, which on balance appears to make good sense. It is
hard to gainsay the Court's decision that trial judges should serve as
"gatekeepers" for expert testimony, as preliminary decision-makers of
whether a qualified expert witness has devoted as much rigor, and has
applied the same exacting methodologies, to the matter before the court
as the expert devotes to his or her own professional projects.
189
Daubert requires trial courts to look seriously at the quality of the
science or technology of a witness proferred as an expert. Courts can no
longer simply pass along to juries the principal task of determining the
validity of expert testimony on difficult questions at the margin of estab-
lished science. As door-closing rules governing the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, the Daubert principles are capable of being applied op-
pressively to smother the judicial airing of legitimate disputes. 190 Instead,
the courts need to apply the principles even-handedly--excluding expert
16l (counting twenty-six), with FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 12 n.8 (counting twenty-one). See
generally Joseph G. Eaton, Special Report: Frye/Daubert in the 50 States, 30 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB.
REP. 333, 338 (2002) (listing standards in every state).
187. For a smattering of cerebration on the perplexing borderland between law and science, see,
for example, ARIEL PORAT & ALEx STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2001), Troyen
A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-
Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 472 (1988), and Heidi Li Feldman, Science and
Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995).
188. See generally Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer
for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563 (2000) (questioning courts' ability to comprehend
genuine scientific inquiry).
189. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); FED. R. EviD. 702
advisory committee's note, supplemental reliability factor (4).
190. See generally Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 873-74 (Neb. 2001) (noting
that while Daubert may be more lenient in that it allows more novel science into evidence, the test
"can also require a more exacting, expensive, and time consuming foundation"); Capra, supra note
9, at 705 (noting that "despite all the focus on aggressive gatekeeping, the practical impact of
Daubert is open to question"); Michael H. Graham, The Daubert Dilemma: At Last A Viable
Solution?, 179 F.R.D. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that the "Supreme Court sought to encourage liberal
admissibility by abolishing a strict Frye test").
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testimony insufficiently grounded in sound methodology, while allowing
such testimony that reasonably if boldly reaches into uncharted waters of
evolving knowledge.' 9' By requiring experts to provide reasoned bases
for their opinions, and by requiring that such opinions be relevant to the
legal issues in the case and grounded in reliable methodology, the reli-
ability and relevancy principles of Daubert, used properly, provide a firm
foundation for the fair and rational resolution of the scientific and tech-
nological issues which lie at the heart of products liability adjudication.
191. Moreover, trial judges must conduct their Daubert duties impartially and avoid giving an
appearance that they disbelieve a party's expert witnesses. See, e.g., Price v. Blood Bank of Del.,
Inc., 790 A.2d 1203, 1210 (Del. 2002).
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